Abstract. The security of an iterated block cipher heavily depends on its structure as well as each round function. Matsui showed that MISTY type structure is faster and more robust than Feistel structure on linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis. On the other hand, Luby and Rackoff proved that the four round Feistel structure is superpseudorandom if each round function fi is a random function. This paper proves that the five round MISTY type structure is super-pseudorandom. We also characterize its round security.
Introduction
The security of an iterated block cipher heavily depends on its structure as well as each round function. There are some well known structures of iterated block ciphers, Feistel structure (for example, DES), MISTY type structure, IDEA type structure and etc. For Feistel structure, Nyberg and Knudsen [7] showed that if each round function is secure against linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis, then the whole block cipher is immune to both attacks. Matsui showed that MISTY type structure is faster and more robust than Feistel structure on linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis [4, 5] .
Pseudorandomness is also an important cryptographic criterion of iterated block ciphers. This approach studies the pseudorandomness of the block cipher by assuming that each round function is ideally random. We say that a block cipher is pseudorandom if it is secure against chosen plaintext attack, where the adversary has access only to the forward direction of the block cipher. It is said to be super-pseudorandom if it is secure under both chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks, where the adversary has access to both directions of the block cipher.
The super-pseudorandomness of Feistel structure has been studied extensively so far. Luby and Rackoff proved that the three round Feistel structure is pseudorandom and the four round Feistel structure is super-pseudorandom if each round function f i is a random function [2] . Patarin gave an alternate proof [8, 9] . Lucks showed that the three round Feistel structure is pseudorandom even if the first round function f 1 is an XOR-universal hash function (not necessarily random) [3] . Naor and Reingold showed that the four round Feistel structure is super-pseudorandom even if the first and the last round functions f 1 and f 4 are XOR-universal [6] . Finally, Ramzan and Reyzin showed that the four round Feistel structure is super-pseudorandom even if the adversary has oracle access to the second and the third round functions f 2 and f 3 , but not super-pseudorandom if the adversary has oracle access to the first or the last round function, f 1 or f 4 [10] .
However, only a little is known about the super-pseudorandomness of MISTY type structure. Sakurai and Zheng showed that the three round MISTY type structure is not pseudorandom, and the four round MISTY type structure is not super-pseudorandom [11] . On the other hand, it is not known if the five round MISTY type structure is super-pseudorandom [11] .
This paper characterizes the super-pseudorandomness of the five round MISTY type structure. We prove that the five round MISTY type structure is super-pseudorandom even if: We also show that it is not super-pseudorandom if the adversary is allowed to have oracle access to the first or the last round function, p 1 or p 5 . Intuitively, our results can be stated as follows. The five round MISTY type structure is super-pseudorandom if: (1) the first and the last rounds have secrecy and only weak randomness, (2) the third and fourth rounds have strong randomness and no secrecy, and (3) the second round has secrecy and only weak randomness, or no secrecy and strong randomness.
To derive our positive results, we use Patarin's approach [8, 9] while Ramzan and Reyzin [10] used the approach of Naor and Reingold [6] .
Related works: About pseudorandomness (but not super-pseudorandomness) Sugita showed that the four round MISTY type structure is pseudorandom [12] , and the five round recursive MISTY type structure is pseudorandom [13] .
Preliminaries

Notation
For a bit string x ∈ {0, 1} 2n , we denote the first (left) n bits of x by x L and the last (right) n bits of x by x R . If S is a probability space, then s R ← S denotes the process of picking an element from S according to the underlying probability distribution. (Unless otherwise specified,) The underlying distribution is assumed to be uniform.
Denote by F n the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n , which consists of 2 n·2 n in total. Similarly, denote by P n the set of all permutations from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n , which consists of (2 n )! in total. By a finite function (or permutation) family F, we denote a set of functions with common domain and common range. We call a finite function (or permutation) family keyed if every function in it can be specified by a key sk. We denote the function given by sk as f sk . We assume that given sk, it is possible to efficiently evaluate f sk at any point (as well as f −1 sk in case of a keyed permutation family). For a given keyed function family, a key can be any string from {0, 1} s , where s is known as "key length." For functions f and g, g • f denotes the function x → g(f (x)).
Super-Pseudorandomness
We are now ready to define a secure block cipher, or what Luby and Rackoff called a super-pseudorandom permutation [2] . The super-pseudorandomness of a keyed permutation family F over {0, 1}
n captures its computational indistinguishability from P n , where the adversary is given access to both directions of the permutation. In other words, it measures security of a block cipher against chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks.
Our adaptive adversary M is modeled as a Turing machine that has blackbox access to some number k of oracles, each of which computes some specified function. 
MISTY Type Permutation [4,5]
Matsui proposed MISTY [4, 5] , which is faster and more robust than Feistel structure on linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis.
Definition 2.3. (The basic MISTY type permutation). Let x ∈ {0, 1}
2n . For any permutation p ∈ P n , define the basic MISTY type permutation, 
2n .
See Fig. 1 (the four round Feistel permutation) and Fig. 2 (the five round MISTY type permutation) for illustrations. Note that p i in Fig. 2 is a permutation whereas f i in Fig. 1 is just a function. For simplicity, the left and right swaps are omitted. 
Round Security of the Five Round MISTY Type Permutation
The round security model of a block cipher was introduced by Ramzan and Reyzin [10] . In the round security model, the adversary is allowed to have oracle access to some subset K of round functions, and the advantage additionally depends on K. 
Uniform -XOR Universal Permutation
Our definition follows from those given in [1, 10, 14] .
Definition 2.6. Let H n be a keyed permutation family over {0, 1}
n . Denote by #H n the size of H n . H n is uniform -XOR universal provided that the following two conditions are satisfied:
for any element x ∈ {0, 1}
n and any element y ∈ {0, 1} n , there exist exactly
for any two distinct elements x, x ∈ {0, 1}
n and any element y ∈ {0, 1} n , there exist at most
We will use the phrase "h is an uniform -XOR universal permutation" to mean that "h is drawn uniformly from an uniform -XOR universal permutation family."
Round Security of MISTY Type Permutation
Negative Result
In this section, we show that ψ(p 1 If O = ψ, then X is the output of p 5 at step 2 and step 3. Hence the input to p 5 at step 2 is equal to that of step 3. Therefore, from step 4 and step 5, we have
In step 8, the output of p 1 is equal to D ⊕ D ⊕ E from step 7. Therefore, the input to p 5 is equal to
Then from eq. (1), we see that the inputs to p 5 are equal in step 8 and step 9. Hence we have p ψ = 1. If O = R, we have p R ≤ 2 2 n .
Positive Result 1
Let h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ∈ H n be uniform -XOR universal permutations and p ∈ P n be a random permutation. Let
3 ), and R ∈ P 2n be a random permutation. Define K = {p, p −1 }. 
is at least
A proof is given in the next section. 
Theorem 3.2. For any 4-oracle adversary M that makes at most m queries in total,
(
That is,
Without loss of generality, we assume that 
Evaluation of p R . From the definition of p R , we have
We say that (R, p) is compatible with (a, A) if the (R, R −1 ) oracles answer a and the (p, p −1 ) oracles answer A. More precisely, (R, p) is compatible with (a, A) if
where
are defined by eq. (3) and eq. (4) A) ∈ B, the number of (R, p) which is compatible with (a, A) is exactly (2 2n − m 0 )!(2 n − m 1 )!. Therefore, we have
from (a, A). For each (a,
Evaluation of p ψ . From the definition of p ψ , we have
Similarly to p R , we have
Then from Lemma 3.1, we obtain that
This can be shown easily by an induction on m 0 ), we have
Applying the same argument to 1 − p ψ and 1 − p R yields that
Finally, (6) and (7) give
Positive Result 2
Let
2 ), and R ∈ P 2n be a random permutation. Define K = {p 1 , p 
are all distinct and
Then the number of
A proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.1. 
Theorem 3.3. For any 8-oracle adversary M that makes at most m queries in total,
n be the answers that M obtains. Let
(X
Without loss of generality, we assume that
Then, similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can denote by
Evaluation of p R . From the definition of p R , we have
Since the number of (R,
is exactly (2
Define C be the total number of possible (a, A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ). Then
Therefore we have
Now we want to evaluate #B 2 . Fix any i and j such that 1
is exactly choice of (i, j), the number of (a, A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) which satisfy
Then from Lemma 3.2, we have
In ψ, we denote by I 3 ∈ {0, 1} n , the input to p in the third round, and denote by O 3 ∈ {0, 1} n , the output of it. Similarly, I 4 , O 4 ∈ {0, 1} n are the input and output of p in the fourth round, respectively. Number of h 1 . First,
L , then there exists no h 1 which satisfies
L , then the number of h 1 which satisfies (12) is at most #H n from Definition 2.6. Therefore, the number of h 1 which satisfies
is at most m0 2 #H n . Next, the number of h 1 which satisfies
is exactly #Hn 2 n from Definition 2.6. Therefore, the number of h 1 which satisfies
is at most m0m1#Hn 2 n . Then, from (13) and (14) , the number of h 1 which satisfies Number of h 3 . Similarly, the number of h 3 which satisfies 
input-output pairs are undetermined. Therefore we have (2 n −2m 0 −m 1 )! possible choices of p for any such fixed (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ) .
Then the number of (h 1 , h 2 , p, h 3 ) which satisfy (2) is at least
